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Calk: Ex Parte Prejudgment Replevin Statute Held Valid.

CASE NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Due Process-Ex Parte
Prejudgment Replevin Statute Held Valid
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., - U.S. -,
94 S. Ct. 1895, - L. Ed. 2d - (1974).
W.T. Grant filed suit against Lawrence Mitchell for the overdue balance
on certain household property. Mitchell had purchased the goods under an
installment sales contract which provided for a vendor's lien. On Grant
Company's application, the trial judge, in accordance with Louisiana procedure, ordered sequestration of the goods without prior notice or opportunity
for a hearing, and denied Mitchell's motion to dissolve the writ on the ground
that the sequestration violated his right of due process under 'the 14th amendment. The appellate court refused to reverse the rulings of the trial court,
and the Supreme Court of Louisiana expressly rejected Mitchell's due process
claim under the federal Constitution.' Mitchell appealed to the United
States Supreme Court. Held--Affirmed. The Louisiana sequestration procedure is not invalid, either on its face or as applied, and it effects a constitutional accommodation of the conflicting interests of the buyer and seller. 2
As Justice White stated in Mitchell, "[s]equestration under the Louisiana
statute is the modern counterpart of an ancient civil law device to resolve
conflicting claims to property."3 Actually, the modern replevin statutes are
strikingly different from the common law action of replevin of six centuries
ago. Replevin at common law was an action for the return of specific goods
wrongfully taken or "distrained," and was one of the most valued defenses
of the feudal tenant against his lord. 4 The modern replevin statutes are most
commonly used by creditors to seize goods allegedly wrongfully detained-not wrongfully taken--by debtors. 5 The result is a creditor oriented action
1. W.T. Grant Co. v. Mitchell, 269 So. 2d 186, ajI'd, -

L. Ed. 2d

-

(1974).

2. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., -

Ed. 2d -, -

U.S.

-,

-,

U.S. -,

94 S. Ct. 1895,

94 S. Ct. 1895, 1899-1900, -

L.

(1974).

3. Id. at -, 94 S. Ct. at 1897, - L. Ed. 2d at-.
4. For a discussion of common law replevin see 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW 284-85 (5th ed. 1942); T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCIsE HISTORY OF THE
COMMON LAW 368 (1956); Krahmer, Fuentes v. Shevin: Due Process and The Consumer, A Legal and Empirical Study, 4 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 23, 30 (1972); 55 MINN.
L. REV. 634, 635 (1971). See generally 77 C.J.S. Replevin §§ 1-3 (1952).
5. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 79 (1972).
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which allows the creditor to repossess such goods prior to any final hearing
or judgment.
For decades creditors have effectively used the replevin procedure to their
benefit, and until recent years had done so without question. It recently became apparent to the Supreme Court, however, that these procedures required re-examination on constitutional issues of due process.6 Such due
process issues usually appear when a debtor has been subjected to an ex parte
prejudgment hearing where his creditor has been granted a writ of sequestration, attachment, or garnishment.
The initial impact on creditors' remedies began with the Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.7 decision in 1969. Sniadach involved an ex parte prejudgment procedure taken pursuant to a Wisconsin wage garnishment statute s
which the petitioner contended violated her right to due process. 9 The Court
agreed with this allegation, 10 and Justice Harlan, in a concurring opinion,
stated that
[a]part from special situations . . .I think that due process is afforded
only by the kinds of 'notice' and 'hearing' which are aimed at establishing the validity, or at least the probable validity, of the underlying claim
against the alleged debtor before he can be deprived of his property
or its unrestricted use."
This analysis of due process was used again by the Court in Goldberg v.
Kelly.' 2 Goldberg involved the validity of prejudgment procedures which
permitted the termination of welfare payments without benefit of a prior evidentiary hearing. 13 Here the court reaffirmed the principle that "the funda6. Id. at 79. The Supreme Court has examined similar problems of due process
and the requirements of "notice" and "hearing" for over a century. See Bell v. Burson,
402 U.S. 535 (1971); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Armstrong v. Manzo, 280
U.S. 545 (1965); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931); Coffin Bros. & Co.
v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928); Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908); Baldwin
v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223 (1863). See generally 16 AM. JuR. 2d, Constitutional
Law § 542-78 (1964).
7. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
8. Wis. L. 1965, ch. 507, § 1, as amended, Wis. STAT. § 267.04(1) (Supp. 1974).
9. Prior to the Sniadach case, the Supreme Court had considered the constitutionality of prejudgment procedures in only three cases, holding in all three that there was
no violation of due process by the prejudgment statutes in question. See McKay v. McIness, 279 U.S. 820 (1929); Coffin Bros. & Co. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928); Ownbey
v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
10. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 341-42 (1969).
11. Id. at 343 (court's emphasis); see Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., 339 U.S.
306 (1950); Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126 (1941); Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
12. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
13. Id. at 261. The recipient could only have a post-termination hearing before an
independent officer, at which he could offer oral evidence, confront witnesses, and have
a record made of the hearing. This procedure was held inadequate; only a pretermination evidentiary hearing would satisfy due process requirements.
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mental requisite of due process is the opportunity to be heard,' 4 and that
the hearing must be "at a meaningful ,time and in a meaningful manner."' 15
The leading case dealing with the constitutional validity of prejudgment
replevin procedures is Fuentes v. Shevin.'6 In separate actions before threejudge district courts, the prejudgment replevin statutes of Florida and
Pennsylvania which authorized summary seizures of personal property upon
an ex parte application by a creditor, were challenged on the grounds that
no hearing was given prior to seizure. Both laws provided that the debtor
could reclaim possession by posting a counterbond within 3 days after
the seizure. The Florida statute relied on -the bare assertion of the party
seeking the writ that he was entitled to it, and required only that the applicant file a complaint initiating a court action for repossession, reciting in conclusory fashion that he was lawfully entitled to possession., 7 The Pennsylvania statute authorized the writ to be issued upon affdavit stating merely
the value of the property to be replevied.' 8 The statutes were upheld by
the federal district courts.1 9
The main issue in the Supreme Court was whether procedural due process
in the context of these cases required an opportunity for a hearing before
the state authorized its agents to seize property in the possession of one person upon the application of another. 20 The Court noted that although due
process is no barrier to the taking of a person's possessions, it does protect
against arbitrary deprivation of property. 21 When a person has an opportunity to speak in his own defense, and when the state is required to listen,
unfair and mistaken deprivations of property interests can usually be pre22
vented.
The law has allowed appropriate variances in the "form" of a hearing "dedending on the importance of the interests involved and the nature of the
subsequent proceedings. ' 23 The Court has long required that whatever the
"form," the opportunity for that hearing must occur before the deprivation
takes place,24 and found in Fuentes that "[t]he Florida and Pennsylvania
14. Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914).
15. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) (adoption decree, issued without notification to the divorced father, violated the due process clause); see Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (hearing required before termination of a driver's license).
16. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
17. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 78.07 (Supp. 1972-73).
18. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, Rule 1073(a) (1967).
19. Epps v. Cortese, 326 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1971), rev'd sub nom., Fuentes
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970),
rev'd sub nom., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
20. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (court's emphasis).
21. Id. at 81.
22. Id. at 81.
23. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971); see Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
24. Bell v. Burson, 402 ,U.S. 535, 542 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 'U.S. 254, 261
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prejudgment replevin statutes fly in the face of this principle. '25 The replevin statutes under attack violated the due process clause notwithstanding
the fact that the debtor could regain possession by posting his own security
bond, or that the taking was only temporary. 26 Fuentes also established that
it is immaterial that the debtor did not have full legal title to the property
replevied since the due process safeguards extend to "any significant property
interest.

'27

The result of the Sniadach and Fuentes decisions was to place a burden
on the creditor's remedy of replevin in the form of respect for consumers'
constitutional rights. 28 In Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.2 9 the Supreme Court
has upheld a Louisiana replevin statute very similar to those challenged in
Fuentes. The puzzling question is whether or not the Mitchell decision has
overruled Fuentes, or whether it has merely left the constitutional status of
ex parte prejudgment replevin statutes in a state of confusion.8 0 The writ
challenged in Mitchell was issued by a judge after Grant Company had submitted the necessary application and affidavit in which it asserted that it had
reason to believe Mitchell would "encumber, alienate or otherwise dispose
of the merchandise described in -the foregoing petition during -the pendency
of the proceedings, and that a writ of sequestration is necessary in the premises."31 Louisiana statutes provide for such writs when
one claims the ownership or right to possession of property, or a mortgage, lien, or privilege thereon . . . if it is within the power of the

defendant to conceal, dispose of, or waste the property or the revenues
therefrom, or32remove the property from the parish, during the pendency
of the action.
The writ shall issue "only when the nature of the claim and the amount
(1970); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 551 (1965); Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 152-53 (1941); Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385-86 (1908).
25. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 83 (1972).
26. Id. at 85; see Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Sniadach v. Family Fin.
Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). Both Bell and Sniadach involved takings of property prior
to final judgment, and in both cases the challenged statutes included recovery provisions,
allowing the defendants to post their own security bond to regain their property. The
court held these deprivations had to be preceded by a fair hearing.

27. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 86 (1972); accord, Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535,
539 (1971); Boddie v. Connecticut; 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397

U.S.254, 262 (1970).
28. For a general discussion of the effect Iof Fuentes see Krahmer, Fuentes v.
Shevrin: Due Process And The Consumer, A Legal and Empirical Study, 4 TEX. TECH
LAw REv.23 (1972).
29. - U.S.-, 94 S.Ct. 1895, - L. Ed. 2d - (1974).

30. Justice Stewart in his dissent forcefully stated that the Mitchell decision actually
overrules Fuentes even though not expressly done so in the majority opinion. Id. at -,
94 S.Ct. at 1913, - L. Ed. 2d at -.
31. Id. at -, 94 S. Ct. at 1897, - L. Ed. 2d at -.
The fact that a judge issued
the writ of sequestration had an important bearing on the majority's reasoning for upholding the Louisiana statute.
32. LA. CODE CIV. Ploc. ANN. art. 3571 (1961).
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thereof, if any, and the grounds relied upon for the issuance of the writ
clearly appear from specific facts" in the verified petition or affidavit.3 3 The
writ is obtainable on the creditor's ex parte application; however, the statute
allows the debtor to seek immediate dissolution of the writ.3 4 Dissolution
must be ordered unless the creditor "proves the grounds upon which the writ
was issued," failing which the court may order return of the property and
assess damages, including attorney's fees,3 5 in favor of the debtor. The
debtor may regain possession of the goods sequestered by filing his own
counterbond as security for payment of the disputed debt. 6 The majority
in Mitchell decided that this procedure provided sufficiently for a balancing
37
of the conflicting interests of the parties.
The Court emphasized that the Louisiana statutes are aimed at protecting
the creditor's interest against possible waste or alienation until a full hearing
is held on the merits. 8 Mitchell had asserted, however, that his right to a
hearing before his possession was disturbed was nonetheless mandated by
Sniadach and Fuentes, but the Court rejected this contention.3 9 The majority
did not expressly overrule Fuentes or expressly reject its principles, but attempted to distinguish the legal issues on the basis of three factors present
in Mitchell:
(1) the plaintiff who seeks the seizure of the property must file an
affidavit stating specific facts that justify the sequestration; (2) the state
official who issues the writ of sequestration is a judge instead of a
clerk of the court; and (3) the issues that govern the plaintiff's right to
sequestration are limited to "the existence of a vendor's lien and the
issue of default .... 40
Justice Stewart found, however, that the deprivation of property in Mitchell
was identical to that in Fuentes, noting that Fuentes explicitly rejected each
of these three factors as a ground for a difference in decision. 41
The first two of the majority's distinctions relate solely to the procedural
33. LA. CODE Civ. PROC. ANN. art. 3501 (1961); see Hancock Bank v. Alexander,
237 So. 2d 669 (La. 1970) (a simple allegation on indebtedness for money due on an
automobile, where no deed of trust was referred to or produced, did not satisfy the "specific facts" test).

34.

LA. CODE Civ. PRoc. ANN. art.

3506 (1961).

35. Id.
36. LA. CODE CiV. PROC. ANN. arts. 3507-08 (1961).
37. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., - U.S. -, -, 94 S. Ct. 1895, 1900, - L. Ed.
2d -, - (1974).
38. Id. at -, 94 S. Ct. at 1901, - L. Ed. 2d at -.
The Court explained: "The
danger of destruction or alienation cannot be guarded against if notice and a hearing
before seizure are supplied. The notice itself may furnish a warning to the debtor
acting in bad faith." Id. at-, 94 S. Ct. at 1901, - L. Ed. 2d at -.
39. Id. at -, 94 S. Ct. at 1902, - L. Ed. 2d at -.
40. Id. at -, 94 S. Ct. at 1904-05, - L. Ed. 2d at -.
The third factor decreased the danger of mistaken seizure and the necessity for an adversary hearing.
41. Id. at -, 94 S. Ct. at 1911, 1912, - L. Ed. 2d at -.
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aspects of the Louisiana statute. 42 The statute requires a plaintiff to state
"specific facts" in his affidavit to justify the issuance of the writ. These affidavits usually consist of pro forma allegations that the debtor has wrongfully
detained the property. The creditor may make whatever statements are necessary to obtain the writ since he is protected from challenge because of the
procedure's ex parte nature. Justice Stewart found the affidavits in Mitchell
and those in Fuentes were similar in effect, and were "'hardly a substitute
for a prior hearing, for they test no more than the strength of the applicant's
own belief in his rights.' ,,43 Justice Stewart also condemned the second distinction, that a judge instead of a court clerk is required to issue the writ,
as this function is only a simple ministerial act, whereby the functionary does
no more than ascertain the formal sufficiency rather 'than the merits of the
creditor's allegations before issuing the writ of sequestration. 4 In fact, this
requirement applies only to Orleans Parish, where the Mitchell case was originally filed, and the same function is performed by ,the court clerk in every
other parish. 45 The dissent found the majority's third distinction, that the
issues are limited to the existence of a vendor's lien and default, equally insubstantial, reasoning that the issues upon which replevin depended in
Fuentes were no different; in both the creditor needed to show only his security interest or vendor's lien and the default by his debtor. 46
It is interesting that the majority in Mitchell did not uphold 'the Louisiana
statute as applied on the ground that the facts presented a situation which
would come within one of -the exceptions to Fuentes. Fuentes stated that
"[t]here are 'extraordinary situations' that justify postponing notice and opportunity for a hearing," but that these situations must be truly unusual. 4 7
Exceptions would include situations where (1) the seizure has been directly
necessary to secure an important governmental or general public interest; (2)
there has been a special need for very prompt action; and (3) the state has
kept strict control over its monopoly of legitimate force. 48 It seems the Court
could have held that the facts in Mitchell established a special need for very
prompt action to prevent the alienation, destruction, or deterioration of the
property by Mitchell's continued use. The majority did not do so, but chose
to rule on the validity of the statute on its face.
42. Id. at -,
94 S. Ct. at 1912, 43. Id. at -,
94 S. Ct. at 1912, 407 U.S. 67, 83 (1972).
44. Id. at -, 94 S. Ct. at 1912, - L.
45. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art.

L. Ed. 2d at
L. Ed. 2d at

-.
-,

quoting Fuentes v. Shevin,

Ed. 2d at-.

281 (1960). This statute was a revision and
the official comments declared that it was intended to "make no change in the law."
Id.
46. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., - U.S. -, -, 94 S. Ct. 1895, 1912, - L. Ed.
2d -, - (1974). Justice White acknowledged in his Fuentes dissent that the essential
issue at any hearing would be whether "there is reasonable basis for his [the creditorvendor's] claim of default." Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 99-100 (1972).
47. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 (1972).
48. Id. at 91.
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Perhaps the Court intended to overrule Futntes by implication, at least
in its practical application. 49 The refusal to frame the decision within the
Fuentes exceptions could be interpreted as a change in policy or an attempt
to break away from the strictly construed safeguards of due process announced in Fuentes. Thus, the majority in Mitchell introduced a "balancing
of interests" test for the procedural safeguards required by due process.5 0
This rationale effectively overrules the broad principles announced in Fuentes
and leaves its mandate in an uncertain state,"' especially considering the
Court's use of the Fuentes "extraordinary situation" test in a case decided
52
only 1 week after Mitchell.
Another important question is what effect the Mitchell decision will have
on state and federal courts in ruling on the constitutionality of replevin
statutes. For example, Fuentes has been used by the Court of Appeals for
-the Fifth Circuit and the Houston Court of Civil Appeals as a basis for finding the Texas landlord lien and prejudgment garnishment statutes unconstitutional because of their ex parte nature, 58 but Texas courts have yet to deter49. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., -

U.S.

-, -,

94 S. Ct. 1895, 1913,

-

L. Ed.

2d -, - (1974).
50. Id. at -, 94 S. Ct. at 1898, - L. Ed. 2d at.
51. See Hobbs, Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.: The 1974 Revised Edition of Con-

sumer Due Process, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE

REV.

182 (1974).

52. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., - U.S. -,
94 S. Ct. 2080,
-,
2088-90, - L. Ed. 2d -, - (1974); see Hobbs, Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.: The 1974

Revised Edition of Consumer Due Process, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 182 (1974).
53. The Texas Baggage Lien for Rent statute, TEx. REV. Civ. STAT.

ANN. art.
5238a (1962), as amended, TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5236d (Supp. 1974) was
held unconstitutional in Hall v. Garson, 468 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1972). The petitioner,
Hall, brought a class action suit against her landlord, Garson. Hall was in arrears in
her rent, and Garson's agent entered Hall's apartment and removed a television set. Subsequently, Garson notified Hall that her television set was being held as security for the
past due rent and that it would be returned upon her paying the arrearage. The class
action was brought on behalf of Hall and all other persons similarly situated, challenging
the constitutionality of the landlord's lien statute under the due process clause. The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held the statute unconstitutional relying on
Fuentes. In the words of the court:
There is no requirement that the landlord first have the validity or the accuracy
of his claim impartially determined, or that a need for immediate seizure be present.
Those decisions are left to the operator himself to act upon with no prior opportunity for challenge- by the-possessor of the property.
id. at 848; accord, Barber v. Rader, 350 F. Supp. 183 (S.D. Fla. 1972); Gross v. Fox.
349 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Shaffer v. Holbrook, 346 F. Supp. 762 (S.D.W.
Va. 1972); Collins v. Viceroy Hotel Corp., 338F. Supp. 390 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Klim
v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Blocker v. Blackburn, 185 S.E.2d 56 (Ga.
1971).
The Texas Court of Civil Appeals of Houston held the Texas prejudgment garnishment statute, TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art..4076 (1966), unconstitutional in Southwestern Warehouse Corp. v. Wee Tote,, Inc., 504 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1974, no writ). The court concluded that the statute under which property
was frozen after writ of garnishment is served, denied due process to the extent that
it froze property without notice and hearing before judgment on the original claim was
determined. This conclusion was based- entirely on the rationale of the Sniadach and
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mine-the validity of the state's attachment statute.5 4 Under that statute the
creditor is required to submit an affidavit stating that a debt exists, the amount
of the debt, and that the debtor is attempting to place his property permanently beyond the jurisdiction of the courts. 5 5 One author suggests that the
narrowness of this statute, coupled with the fact that the circumstances which
allow a writ of attachment to be issued, -might bring it within the Fuentes
exceptions ("extraordinary situations" or "immediate danger").511 However,
the statute provides for attachment after alleging a "general debt" and not
on a creditor's legal interest in any particular goods. This aspect of the statute would present difficulty if challenged on due process grounds, as Fuentes
held a prejudgment procedure unconstitutional even where a vendor's lien
existed. It is also questionable whether the attachment statute would be held
valid under Mitchell. One reason that the Supreme Court upheld the
Louisiana sequestration statute was that it provided for uninterrupted judicial
supervision. The Texas statute provides that a writ of attachment may be
issued by a judge, clerk, or justice of the peace; 7 therefore the status of the
procedure would be questionable even in the light of Mitchell.
This same problem exists with the Texas sequestration statute which also
authorizes the issuance of the writ by a clerk. 58 If this fact does not affect
the constitutionality of the statute, however, then it could arguably be held
constitutional Under the "extraordinary situations" or "immediate danger" exception in Fuentes,59 since a writ will not issue unless the defendant is about
to injure, waste, destroy, dispose, or remove property in which the plaintiff
has a legal interest.60
Fuentes decisions. Accord, Western Coach Corp. v. Shreve, 475 F.2d 754 (9th Cir.

1973); Brunswick Corp. v. Galaxy Cocktail Lounge, Inc., 513 P.2d 1390 (Hawaii 1973);
Olympic Forest Prods., Inc. v. Chaussee Corp., 511 P.2d 1002 (Wash. 1973); see Randone v. Appellate Dep't, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 924 (1972);
Jones Press, Inc. v. Motor Travel Servs., Inc., 176 N.W.2d 87 (Minn. 1970); Larson
v. Fetherson, 172 N.W.2d 20 (Wis. 1969).
54. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 275 (1973).
55. Id.
56. Comment, Fuentes v. Shevin: The Constitutionality of Texas' Landlord Laws
and Other Summary Procedures,25 BAYLOR L. REV. 215, 239 (1973).
57. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 275 (1973).
58. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6840 (1960).
59. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.,
U.S. -, -, 94 S. Ct. 1895, 1912, - L. Ed.
2d -,

-

(1974)

(dissenting opinion).

In Garcia v. Krausse, -

F. Supp. -

(S.D.

Tex. 1974), the Texas sequestration statute, TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. STAT. ANN. art. 6840
(1960), was held unconstitutional on the basis of Mitchell. The court said the important distinguishing feature in the Texas and Louisiana statutes was that article 6840 authorizes issuance of a writ by a clerk, whereas the Louisiana statute authorized the writ
to be issued only by a judge; thus providing judicial administration and supervision from
the beginning of the process. The court stayed its order pending appeal, stating there
was substantial ground for a difference of opinion on the questions of law presented by
the case.
. .60. See TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6840 (1960).
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Whether Mitchell will have a significant impact on untested prejudgment
replevin statutes will soon be discovered. 1' Perhaps one court was correct
when it suggested that when the full Supreme Court decided a case
similar to Fuentes, that the outcome would be different. 2 If the Court's
"policy" toward creditors' remedies has suddenly changed with the addition
of Justices Powell and Rehnquist,63 this "policy" was not clearly indicated by
61. Justice White, dissenting in Fuentes, suggested that the Court's decision in
Fuentes would not affect self-help remedies available to creditors under the UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-503 which states:
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take possession
of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed without
judicial process if this can be done without breach of the peace or may proceed
by action ....
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 103 (1972). Although the Mitchell opinion, written by
Justice White, did not concern self-help remedies under the UCC, the fact that Justice
White wrote the majority opinion gives more weight to the Fuentes dissent.
The major issue concerning state statutes similar to § 9-503 of the UCC is whether
such self-help repossession of a debtor's property is action under the color of state law
within the meaning of the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1343(3) (1970). The majority of cases have held such repossession does not constitute "state action," and thus is not violative of the due process clause. Adams v.
Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324, 329-38 (9th Cir. 1974); Kirksey v.
Theilig, 351 F. Supp. 727, 732 (D. Colo. 1972); Pease v. Havelock Nat'l Bank, 351 F.
Supp. 118, 120-21 (D. Neb. 1972); Greene v. First Nat'l Exch. Bank, 348 F. Supp.
672, 675 (W.D. Va. 1972); Oiler v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21, 23 (N.D. Cal.
1972); accord, McCormick v. First Nat'l Bank, 322 F. Supp. 604, 607 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
See generally Clark & Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes and Beyond: The Creditor Meets the
Constitution, 59 VA. L. REV. 355, 377-83 (1973); Hughes, Creditors' Self-Help Remedies
Under UCC Section 9-503: Violative of Due Process in Texas?, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 701
(1973-74); Comment, Sell-help Repossession: Fuentes and Judicial Process, 46 TEMP.
L.Q. 540 (1973); Comment, State Action and the Constitutionality of UCC § 9-503,
30 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 547 (1973); Note, Self-Help Repossession: the Constitutional
Attack, the Legislative Response and the Economic Implications, 62 GEO. L.J. 273
(1973); Note, Constitutional Law: State Action: UCC Self-Help Repossessing Provisions (§§ 9-503, 9-504) Violate Due Process Requirements, 57 MINN. L. REV. 621
(1973); Annot., 18 A.L.R. Fed. 223, 273-76 (1974).
62. In Roofing Wholesale Co., Inc. v. Palmer, 502 P.2d 1327 (Ariz. 1972), Arizona's Supreme Court held Fuentes was not authority for holding Arizona's prejudgment
garnishment statute unconstitutional on due process grounds, as the procedure was ex
parte, because Fuentes was decided by a seven-man court and "thus was advisory and
non-binding." The reasoning was that in the opinion of the Court, a four-judge majority
was not a "clear" majority, and a similar case would probably be decided differently
when the full Supreme Court took part in such a case. Id. at 1329.
Such a decision was either a direct refusal to follow a Supreme Court mandate, or
an indirect method to hold the Arizona statute valid despite its constitutional shortcomings. Without a doubt, the Arizona Supreme Court's concept of what constitutes a binding precedent from the Supreme Court has never been a part of the federal jurisprudence.
See Carrington, The Supreme Court: The Problem of Minority Decisions, 44 A.B.A.J.
137 (1958).
Subsequent to the Roofing Wholesale Co. decision, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit declared the same garnishment statute unconstitutional in Western Coach Corp.
v. Shreve, 475 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1973), thereby rejecting the Arizona Supreme Court's
philosophy.
63. Justice Stewart emphasized in Mitchell that the majority had actually overruled
Fuentes "without pointing to any change in either societal perceptions or basic constitu-
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